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protection guaranteed by the Constitution should not be limited
lest our judicial machinery should become overburdened.
Moreover, the dissent points out that if the Court must limit
Mapp prospectively, it should at least allow Mapp to be applied
retrospectively in cases where the offense was committed after
the Mapp offense, but the conviction was made final before Mapp
was decided. Linldetter's offense was committed after the Mapp
offense, but his conviction was made final before Mapp. Is the
conviction of Linkletter impregnable to collateral attack because
his trial and appeal were pushed along at a faster pace than
Mapp's? If the Ohio courts had proceeded with the same speed
as the Louisiana courts, Linkletter's case would not have been
decided before the decision in Mapp; consequently, Linidetter
would have received direct relief after Mapp was decided.
The Linkletter decision represents the first time the Supreme
Court has limited its decision prospectively in a criminal case
involving constitutional rights. This raises the question of whether
the Court will limit its decisions prospectively in the future, where
constitutional issues similar to the one in Mapp are involved. In
trying to determine how the Court will decide in these areas,
one should be cautious when relying on precedent. The cases before Linkletter indicated a retrospective application might be
givefi Mapp; however, the Court distinguished these precedents
and limited the rule in Mapp prospectively. Consequently, no
generalization should be drawn in regard to retrospectivity in
criminal cases not yet adjudicated by the Supreme Court.
Menis Elbert Ketchum, II

Criminal Law-Administrative Law and the Right to
Trial by Jury
Ds were indicted for evasion of taxes owed for the years 1944,
1945, and 1946. The taxes were duly assessed by the commissioner
in 1955. The indictment charged Ds with wilfully attempting to
evade and defeat the payment of income taxes. In the criminal
prosecution, the jury was instructed that the assessments were
valid as a matter of law because the validity of an administrative
order cannot be passed upon by a jury. Held, reversed. In a
criminal prosecution of one charged with the commission of a
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1965
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felony, Ds have an absolute right to a jury determination upon all
essential elements of the offense. United States v. England, 347
F.2d 425 (7th cir. 1965).
Administrative law and its effect on the right to trial by jury
as guaranteed by the sixth amendment of the Constitution present
a novel and perplexing problem. In a criminal prosecution for
the violation of an administrative order, is the accused guaranteed
the right to have the validity of the order passed upon by the jury?
.The Supreme Court faced this question in a case which arose
under the 1940 Selective Training and Service Act. In Falbo v.
United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944), D was criminally prosecuted
for wilful failure to obey a local draft board order to report for
assignment to work of national importance. D claimed that he
had been improperly classified as a conscientious objector rather
than a minister. The Court held that the validity of an administrative order could not be questioned in a criminal proceeding until
the administrative process had been completed. Any review then
would be by the court and not by a jury. The Court also indicated
that if Congress had provided an exclusive method of judicial
review, a collateral attack on the administrative order would not
be permitted in a criminal proceeding.
Two months later the Court faced the problem in Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). Ps were butchers who violated an Office of Price Administration price ceiling. They did
not avail themselves of the review procedure established by the
Office of Price Administration Act. They were not allowed to
challenge the validity of the order as a defense to a criminal
proceeding. The Court held that D had no constitutional right
to have the validity of a price regulation submitted to the jury
when he had adequate means to test the validity of the regulation
in the Emergency Court of Appeals.
The issue was raised again in 1946 and 1947 in two similiar
cases. In Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946), and in Cox
v. United States, 332 U.S. 442 (1947), the validity of a local draft
board order was questioned. Ps wanted the jury to pass upon the
validity of the classifications by the board. The Court held in
Estep that the validity of an administrative order could be reviewed in a criminal proceeding. However, this was limited to
judicial review by the court, and the jury had no right to pass
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol68/iss1/8
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upon it. In both of the cases, the Court held that the constitutional
right to jury trial does not include the right to have a jury pass
on the facts underlying the validity of an administrative order.
A similiar result was reached in the case of United States v.
Heikkiner, 240 F.2d 94 (7th cir. 1957). Here, D was charged with
the violation of a deportation order. In the criminal prosecution
for violation of this order, D contended that he was being deprived of his liberty in violation of due process and the right to
trial by jury under the sixth amendment. D wanted the issue of
the validity of the order to be ruled upon by the jury. The court
followed the decisions in the Estep case and the Cox case, holding
that although D was entitled to attack the validity of the deportation order by having the issue submitted to the trial judge and
the reviewing courts, he had no constitutional right to have the
jury pass upon the validity of the order.
Several years prior to the Heikkiner case, there was evidence
of a shift in position of several of the Supreme Court Justices on
the issue involved in the present case. Delivering the majority
opinion in United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169 (1952), Justice
Douglas stated that the issue of "splitting the elements" of a
criminal offense between an administrative agency and a trial
court or jury was far from being settled federal practice. Although
the question was not in issue in the case, he stated that there
would be time to consider whether the validity of a deportation
order could be ruled upon either by the jury or by the court.
The court's holding in the principal case appears to represent a
complete reversal of the position taken in previous cases. Thus,
all essential elements of a crime must be determined by the jury.
This means that the jury is not to accept any essential element
as being established merely because such element previously was
passed upon by an administrative agency. Administrative proceedings are often informal. Guilt does not have to be shown beyond
a reasonable doubt, but only by a preponderance of the evidence.
Almquist v. Shenandoah Nurseries, 218 Iowa 724, 354 N.W. 35
(1934). However, the protection offered by the sixth amendment
is attenuated by allowing an administrative agency to rule on an
essential element of a crime.
Perhaps, the decision in the instant case will eliminate this
practice. If so, the court has taken a significant step towards allowDisseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1965
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ing an administrative order to be passed upon by a jury where such
order constitutes an essential element of a crime. The constitutional
guarantees of a jury determination of all the essential elements of
a crime are thus preserved.
William Jack Stevens

Criminal Law-Kidnapping
The Ds entered *the complaintants' car and forced them to
drive twenty-seven blocks. During the trip the Ds robbed the
complaintants. The Ds were convicted of kidnapping, robbery,
and criminal possession of a pistol. The New York Court of
Appeals reversed the kidnapping conviction. A majority of the
judges reasoned that because kidnapping is a very serious crime
with harsh punishment and the offense committed was essentially
robbery, the kidnapping statute should not be applied. The court
reached this conclusion after admitting that the language of the
kidnapping statute might literally apply. People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d
159, 204 N.E.2d 842 (1965).
Before 1932 kidnapping was considered a less serious crime than
it is today. In thirty states the penalty for kidnapping was less
than life imprisonment. 26 J. Am. INST. CumM. L.&C. 762 (1936).
In 1932 a rash of kidnappings culminated in the abduction and
murder of Charles Lindbergh, Jr., and to meet the threat of the
sudden outbreak of kidnapping legislatures in most states changed
their statutes or enacted new ones. West Virginia followed a
typical pattern. In 1933 the West Virginia legislature decided to
impose the death penalty for the crime of false imprisonment to
extort ransom. W. VA. CoDE ch. 61, art. 2, § 14a (Michie 1961);
Comment, 67 W. VA. L. REv. 156 (1965).
Kidnapping statutes have changed little from their 1930 form.
They all contemplate the unlawful restraint of the victim. However, they may be divided into three different groups as to the
element of the defendant's purpose. A majority of the state acts
make punishable as kidnapping an unlawful restraint only when
the defendant's purpose was to extort ransom. Other acts are
broader in that the defendant's purpose may have been either to
extort ransom or to rob. A=z. REV. STAT. art. 25, § 13-492 (1965);
CAL. PENAL CODE. § 209; NEV. REv. STAT. tit. 13, ch. 20.320 (1963);
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